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Introduction 
The Hungarian government is greatly concerned about the fiscal implications 
of continuing the tradition of assuming almost total respons ibility for 
disaster risk losses; financial authorities would welcome more private 
involvement. Hungary faces catastrophic flood risks over half of its territory, 
and floods appear to be worsening in intensity and frequency. Public 
authorities are thus faced with increased liability for (i) maintain ing the 
state’s vast network of structural flood-prevention measures, many of which 
have been criticized in terms of their cost effectiveness in a World Bank-
financed study (Halcrow 1999), and (ii) offering generous compensation 
(approaching 100 percent of damage) to flood victims. Hungarian 
membership in the European Union has committed the government to a 
program of fiscal austerity and for this reason financial authorities are 
seeking ways to transfer risk to households and businesses in exposed areas. 
However, many Hungarians regard the transfer of liability for flood losses to 
citizens, especially those living in very poor areas, as unfair. One of the 
more controversial issues in Hungary, and throughout highly  exposed 
countries in Europe, Asia and Latin America, is the respective roles of the 
government and the private market in preventing disaster losses and 
providing relief to flood victims. 
Economists view private responsibility for disaster risks as important for 
providing market incentives for individual loss-prevention measures and to 
discourage development in high-risk regions. Attribution of responsibility 
invokes fundamental questions of equity and social solidarity in responding 
to extreme circumstances, especially in poor and vulnerable regions. How 
much should taxpayers in non-risk areas contribute to loss prevention and 
compensation of victims in vulnerable communities? To what extent should 
those living in high-risk areas bear the burden and should they be 
encouraged to relocate or take loss-reduction measures? Experts, alone, 
cannot decide these value-laden questions. The solution requires 
A Model-based Stakeholder Approach for Designing a Disaster Insurance 
 
 164 
consideration in a broad based democratic process that takes into account the 
diverse constructions of the problems. 
The drawbacks of relying solely on an expert-driven process for disaster risk 
management have become apparent in Turkey. The implementation of a 
recent decree on an insurance pool is stalled and perhaps even jeopardized 
by the reluctance of the Turkish parliament to legislate its continuation.  
Turkey has experienced more than twelve major earthquakes in the last 
century and recent estimates suggest a yearly probability as high as 0.02 of a 
major earthquake in Istanbul (Erdik 2000). A pressing issue facing Turkish 
policy makers is how much to invest in the prevention of human and 
economic losses and how to pool the economic losses that inevitably remain. 
The recently introduced Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool (TCIP), an 
initiative of the Turkish government and the World Bank, attempts to solve 
the fundamental problem of the non-affordability of earthquake insurance in 
highly exposed developing countries and link insurance with loss reduction. 
To keep premiums low, the TCIP offers limited cover and transfers some of 
the risk out of the country with World Bank support. Earthquake insurance 
policies will be obligatory for all property owners, who pay a (partially) risk-
based fee to a (privately administered) public fund. The fee is based on the 
seismic zone (location) of the property, the construction of the building and 
mitigation measures implemented. Importantly, only persons holding 
insurance policies will be eligible for additional government assistance after 
a disaster, thus moving signif icantly in the direction of proactive risk 
management.  
The TCIP also takes an important step towards transferring responsibility for 
post-disaster relief and recovery from the government to households in risk 
zones, and in so doing so provides incentives for property owners to retrofit 
their apartments and take other risk-reduction measures. The system sets 
another important precedent. For the first time, a layer of insured risks will 
be absorbed by an international entity, in this case the World Bank, through 
a contingent loan facility offering favorable conditions. This groundbreaking 
system could be a model for proactive disaster aid from wealthy countries to 
poor ones. The scheme is receiving attention in the climate-change 
community as a possibility for industrialized countries to support adaptation 
measures in developing countries (Linnerooth-Bayer, et al. 2003). The fund, 
however, has been criticized in that it makes no allowance for financing 
directly loss-reduction measures (Balamir  2002). It is also unfortunate that 
its full implementation is stalled by the failure of the Turkish parliament to 
pass the requisite legislation for its continuation.  
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A pilot project, carried out by the International Institute for Appliced 
Systems Analysis (IIASA) with the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and 
Stockholm University,1 developed and tested a model-based, community 
participation procedure for designing a disaster reduction and insurance 
system for Hungary. The focus was on the very poor Upper Tisza river 
region in northeastern Hungary. In this paper we describe a participatory 
process that combines stakeholder interviews, a public questionnaire and a 
stakeholder workshop. A challenge for this process was to identify the 
contending perspectives and preferred policy directions for flood risk 
management, and more concretely to identify a “clumsy” policy path for a 
nationwide, public -private insurance/compensation system. A clumsy policy 
can be thought of as one that enjoys wide support among stakeholders and is 
based on different perceptions of the problem and competing values and 
worldviews (see Linnerooth-Bayer and Vári, forthcoming). A unique feature 
of this process was a computer simulation model of flood losses, a so-called 
catastrophe model that made use of Monte Carlo simulations and advanced 
adaptive stochastic optimization. The model illustrated the outcomes of the 
contending policy measures for reducing and sharing flood losses suggested 
by the stakeholders. 
The pilot “Tisza study” was a success in the sense that the stakeholders, who 
held strongly competing views on the flood risk pooling issue and its 
resolution, reached a consensus on a way forward. This consensus has 
similarities, and also important differences, with the TCIP. Most 
significantly, the Hungarian stakeholders agreed on a radical change from 
current practice and, consistent with the TCIP, only households with partial 
insurance cover would be eligible for post-disaster government assistance. 
However, they were unanimously opposed to mandatory insurance polic ies, 
which they viewed as a tax, and most stakeholders opposed risk-based 
premiums in poor regions opting instead for social solidarity (similar to the 
French insurance pool). These results cannot be transplanted to Turkey, but 
the Hungarian consensus does raise the question of whether a stakeholder 
process in designing the earthquake insurance scheme might have avoided 
the current parliamentary stalemate. 
We begin the next section by describing the background of the flood risk 
problem in Hungary, specifically in the Upper Tisza river basin. We turn in 
section 3 to illustrating the competing views of the problem and its solution 
based on extensive interviews with 24 active stakeholders (round 1). In 
action 4 we report on the results of a nationwide public survey that elicited 
detailed views on the flood problem, its causes and possible responses 
                                                                 
1 The study was funded by the Swedish FORMAS. 
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(round 2). Based on the results of the interviews and public survey, three 
plausible policy options for the design of an insurance system were 
identified (round 3). In section 5 we describe the catastrophe/policy model 
that simulated the distribution of future flood losses based on policy options  
identified. In other words, the model answered the question: what would be 
the losses to the local population, the national government and private 
insurance companies if one of the insurance regimes was legislated? Armed 
with this model, stakeholders revisited the options, which resulted in a 
revised set of three policy paths (round 4). Section 6 describes the last 
stakeholder iteration (round 5), which took the form of a deliberative 
stakeholder workshop where participants chose and argued for their 
preferred policy option. The paper concludes by presenting the consensus 
reached at this workshop on a policy direction for a public-private insurance 
system in Hungary. 
Background 
One of the highest flood-risk areas in Hungary, and one of the poorest 
regions in Europe, is the Upper Tisza river basin in the northeastern part of 
the country. The Tisza River originates in the Carpathians in the Ukraine and 
flows through Romania and Slovakia to Hungary, eventually reaching the 
Danube in Serbia. The intensity and frequency of floods in this region and 
throughout Hungary appear to be increasing, but there is little consensus of 
the role land use practices such as deforestation and climate change are 
playing. Pecher et al. (1999) point out that from 1877 to 1933, the average 
period between high water discharges resulting in disastrous floods on the 
Tisza River was 18 years; from 1933 to 1964 it was only three to four years. 
Since 1998, river water levels have broken records annually, but the 
extensive network of levees surrounding the river has prevented major 
losses. The 2001 flood, however, burst through the protective levees causing 
extensive damage. Since flood waves originating upstream in Ukraine arrive 
in Hungary at very high speeds, there is little time for warning and 
preparation. 
Communities in the Upper Tisza region, especially high-risk areas near the 
Tisza River and its tributarie s, are among the poorest in Hungary. Most of 
the predominantly farming towns, with bad road connections, are located far 
from cities. Especially among the less skilled Roma population, the rate of 
unemployment in the region is very high and agriculture alone cannot 
support the local population. Riverine flooding and inland waters have 
aggravated this situation considerably. There are communities, for instance, 
where free seed is distributed, but the residents are unwilling to sow mainly 
due to flood risk (Horváth, et al. 2001). 
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More positively, the area has a large and undeveloped potential for  
recreation, tourism, and nature conservation. There are pristine areas 
surrounding the meandering Tisza River and its flood plain is sprinkled with 
old villages, traditional farms and historic buildings. Tourism was on the rise 
until 2000, when the area was stigmatized by a cyanide spill into the Szamos 
and Tisza rivers caused by the breakage of a tailings impoundment 
maintained by the AURUL Australian-Romanian joint venture mining 
company in northwestern Romania. Until this event, water sports had been 
developing in the area; however, infrastructure supporting these sports 
remains underdeveloped, and there is uncertainty about the future of the 
region with regard to tourism (Vári, et al. forthcoming). 
While there is little controversy that flood risks are a problem in the Tisza 
region and throughout much of Hungary, there is little agreement on why 
they are a problem or what should be done about them. The challenge to 
some stakeholders is to design cost-effective flood-control interventions, and 
according to others, to move people out of areas where the costs are too 
high. Seen differently, however, overflowing rivers are a natural part of the 
ebb and flow of ecosystems, and the challenge is to live in harmony with the 
river. Likewise, there are different views with regard to who should bear the 
losses. Many view government as responsible for protecting the public, thus 
government should absorb the losses. Social solidarity with flood victims is 
a valued public virtue that promotes a humanitarian and equitable society. 
Others are concerned about disincentives created by overly generous public 
compensation and see individual responsibility as the cornerstone of a flood 
risk system.  
The challenge for this pilot project was to design and test a stakeholder 
process that could potentially reach consensus on a flood risk management 
system, taking into account these contending constructs of the problem and 
its solution. The process described in the next sections and illustrated in 
figure 1 included stakeholder interviews, a public questionnaire, a flood-risk 
policy model and a stakeholder workshop. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The Upper Tizsa Study 
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Round One: Stakeholder Interviews to Identify Feasible 
Policy Paths 
Nearly all Hungarians have a stake in the flood risk management system for 
the Upper Tisza region. Citizens are impacted directly through exposure to 
flood risks or indirectly through tax payments for flood loss mitigation and 
relief. Flood insurance payments subsidize those living in high-risk areas and 
foregone public amenities due to flood-relief expenditures.  For instance, 
after the 1998 Tisza flood, the central government justified the suspension of 
building a new section of the Budapest subway in order to divert funds for 
flood relief. For the purpose of eliciting stakeholder views on flood risk 
management strategies for the Upper Tisza region, round one of the 
participatory process was carried out with face-to-face, open-ended 
interviews with those stakeholders who are actively involved in and 
informed of policy issues. These included twenty-four persons representing 
central, regional and local government agencies, farmers and entrepreneurs, 
NGO activists and insurance companies (Vári 2001). From these interviews, 
three types, but contending, flood-policy strategies emerged: state protection, 
individual responsibility, and ecological preservation of the region. 
State Protection 
In Hungary, like all formerly socialist countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe, the central government has traditionally taken the primary 
responsibility for protecting the public from floods and their impacts. In the 
socialist regime prior to 1990, the powerful national water authority (Vituki) 
boasted a staff of 25,000 people working in Budapest and twelve regional 
branches. The main mission of Vituki was to protect Hungary’s territory 
from riverine flooding and the authorities invested huge sums in a vast 
network of protective levees, including 3,000 kilometers of embankments 
along the Tisza River. From a hydrologists’ view, these enormous  
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expenditures could be justified. Foremost, no one in Hungary should be 
exposed to a life-threatening flood risk. Secondly, without the levees, it was 
argued, huge areas of Hungary could be flooded. Government estimates 
show that an unprotected flood on the Tisza could inundate up to 17 percent 
of the territory of Hungary (Ministry of Transportation and Water 
Management 2001). Until recently, these investments had not been analyzed 
from a cost-benefit perspective. 
Levees are not a once-time measure since their maintenance and 
improvement require continuous investment. As the Tisza experience shows, 
flood waves appear to be worsening in intensity, with a corresponding 
imperative for authorities to build the levees higher and higher. Indeed, after 
the once-in-a-hundred-years flood wave nearly topped the embankments in 
1998, the central government accelerated its levee-construction program for 
the Upper Tisza and its tributaries (Horváth, et al. 2001). This once-in-a-
hundred-years flood was exceeded just three years later when an 11-meter 
high flood wave broke through the levees causing extensive damage - and 
justification for the water authorities to build the levees even higher. 
Whereas few Hungarians oppose the protection offered by the government, 
the authors of a recent study funded by the World Bank question whether the 
costs justify the resources protected in the Tisza basin (Halcrow 1999). Since 
there is little economic output from subsistence farming, it may make 
economic sense for the people in the high-risk areas to relocate. Despite 
these reservations, following the 1998 Tisza flood, the government invested 
US$5 million in strengthening and heightening some 10 kilometers of levees 
along the river. Following the levee breach of March 2001, the government 
recognized the insufficiency of even these heightened levees. Officials began 
discussing other flood-mitigation measures, including the construction of 
emergency reservoirs in Hungary and upstream Ukraine to increase the 
capacity of the main riverbed and change land use practices in the flood 
plains (Váradi 2001). Structural flood-protection measures are supported by 
nearly all stakeholders interviewed. They consider the strengthening and 
heightening of the existing levees as inevitable, even if only along certain 
sections of the river. 
Along with taking full responsibility for protecting the Hungarian public 
from flood risk, the government is held accountable for water that comes 
through or over levees. There is no statutory requirement for the Hungarian 
government to compensate flood victims, yet the nationa l authorities almost 
always assume full liability for private damage in the event of a levee 
breach. They also compensate victims generously for other types of flood 
damage such as groundwater inundation. After the Tisza floods in 2001, the 
government fully rebuilt nearly 1,000 houses (with raised platforms to 
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reduce the risk of further flood damage) that had washed away. While no 
blame was attributed to residents, businesses and farmers in high-risk areas, 
everyone agreed on the importance of zoning restrictions within the at-risk 
areas – another top-down flood protection measure. This taxpayer solidarity 
with flood victims is typical in all former socialist countries of Central 
Europe, and as recent floods in Germany and Austria showed, it is also 
typical in Central Europe more generally. It also fits the interests and 
worldview of hierarchical organizations; when compensation is at the 
discretion of authorities, they decide who deserves and how much is 
deserved. Hierarchical government has strong appeal to those who see 
assistance to disaster victims, even if it encourages risk-taking behavior, as 
promoting a humanitarian and stable society. Indeed, after the outpour ing of 
assistance to flood victims in Austria, many commentators considered the 
costly flood events as positive in reinforcing Austrian humanitarian values 
and social cohesiveness. 
Individual Responsibility 
Following the political transition in 1990, many, especially the powerful 
Finance Ministry, began to view significant government expenditure on 
protective flood levees, victim relief and reconstruction (and on the requisite 
bureaucratic machinery) as economically unsustainable. As a case in point, 
the rebuilding and repair of damaged homes and buildings from the 2001 
flood was criticized as excessive by many of the stakeholder interviewees. 
While government officials hesitate to relinquish public authority and 
control in the financing of flood risk, externally imposed demand for fiscal 
responsibility is forcing officials to encourage more private responsibility in 
preventing and insuring flood losses. This move toward individual 
responsibility is contested by the water authorities who continue to see their 
role as providing uncompromised flood protection.  
While fiscal necessity may force a partly reluctant government to switch 
towards more individual responsibility, stakeholders who would like to see 
less government intervention generally welcome this change. A main 
concern among those holding this view is that government responsibility 
creates disincentives for individuals to take protective actions. After the huge 
costs of the floods in the U.S. Midwest in 1993, the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers came under heavy attack for creating a seemingly risk-free zone 
that had attracted large investments in protected areas (Quijano 2001). If 
uninsured disaster victims are guaranteed grants and low-interest loans that 
enable them to continue to locate their property in hazard-prone areas, 
taxpayers will be subject to increasingly larger expenditures for bailing out 
victims of future disasters. For this reason, the authors of a book suggesting 
A Model-based Stakeholder Approach for Designing a Disaster Insurance 
 
 171 
reforms to the U.S. natural disaster program argue for making private 
responsibility and insurance a cornerstone of catastrophic risk management 
(Kunreuther and Roth 1998).  
The stakeholder discourse in Hungary is notably short on attributing 
responsibility to individuals or communities in high-risk areas. With the 
exception of blaming the new landlords in the Tisza area for not maintaining 
the water drains and culverts, the stakeholders made little mention of 
individual loss-reduction measures. Nor is there a sense that individuals and 
communities should be fully insured. This is true throughout Central Europe. 
For instance, after the 1997 floods in Poland, the prime minister made a 
public statement that uninsured victims had only themselves to blame for 
their financial losses and should not expect government compensation. This 
remark raised such a public outcry that the prime minister was forced to 
apologize (Stripple  1998). 
In comparison to Western European countries and the U.S., a large 
percentage of Hungarian households, almost 60 percent, carry flood 
insurance offered by one Hungarian and 16 foreign-owned insurers 
(Horváth, et al. 2001). The reason for this high insurance uptake is that flood 
policies are “bundled” with residential property insurance that is required for 
homeowner mortgage. In the poor Upper Tisza region, however, only about 
40 percent of the households have purchased flood insurance. While 
insurance is not uncommon, insurers offer only extremely limited cover, 
mainly for levee breakage or over-topping. The premium for homeowner 
flood insurance is independent of the risk; in fact, insurers charge all 
households in Hungary an equal percentage of their property insurance 
premium (flat rate) to cover flooding. This has resulted in significant cross-
subsidization from people living in low-risk areas. Like in the U.K., cross-
subsidization makes it possible for poor people in high-risk areas to afford 
flood coverage, albeit limited. This sharing of risk is a cornerstone of the 
current insurance compensation regime. 
In Hungary, the notion of incentives to promote individual loss-reduction 
initiatives, including risk-based insurance premiums, received mixed 
reviews. The incentive issue appeared somewhat irrelevant for very poor 
areas, as one participant at the stakeholder workshop aptly put it: “The issue 
is not that I want to grow wheat at the wrong place, but it's rather that I won't 
be able to restart my life after a flood.” However, many respondents did 
agree that the government might withhold compensation of flood losses from 
those living in or owning buildings without a permit. Opinions also varied 
with regard to providing financial incentives for transferring people out of 
inundated areas. Some stakeholders expected that many people would move 
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away anyway because of the region’s manifold problems. Others claimed 
that the local people are happy where they live and would not welcome 
deserting their historic villages even with financial support. They pointed to 
the negative effects of relocation incentives, noting that more people would 
seek scarce jobs in urban centers. There was little concern about people  
moving into high-risk areas because of the region’s economic disadvantages. 
Another important finding, especially with regard to the TCIP, was that 
mandatory insurance was rejected by a majority of stakeholders. Generally, 
stakeholders were suspicious of private insurers and regarded mandatory 
policies as a tax. Even the insurance representative was in opposition, stating 
that the concept may be contrary to the Hungarian constitution. 
Ecological Preservation 
While few Hungarians appear to be concerned about inefficiencies regarding 
the allocation of costs and benefits in the levee construction program, many 
voices, in particular those of environmentalists, raised objections to the 
levees for other reasons. Protecting the upstream areas with engineered, 
structural measures ultimately pushes river water downstream to riparians of 
the lower Tisza River and the Danube River. Levees are thus viewed as 
harmful and playing a role in the destruction of the river basin’s ecology. 
What is needed is a holistic approach to the region’s sustainable 
development, perhaps even turning the area into a national park. Rather than 
framing the problem as primarily a failure of individuals and communities to 
take protective actions, many see the failure as lying within the system, 
particularly the failure of the authorities to institute sustainable and holistic 
policies that prevent disasters and their losses.  
A local environmental NGO pointed to systemic sources of flooding, such as 
growing urbanization, the increase in paved and impermeable surfaces, 
deforestation and other land-use practices, and the vulnerability of the poor. 
Environmentalists saw the problem as stemming from increased soil erosion 
due to extensive clear felling and forest cutting in Ukraine. By some 
estimates, the wooded area of the Ukraine’s Transcarpathian region has been 
reduced by one-half to two-thirds of its former area (Pecher, 1999). Indeed, 
there was almost unanimous agreement among stakeholders on the value of 
reforestation in the catchments areas, especially in the Ukraine. There was a 
great deal of skepticism however, on how effective a role the Hungarian 
government could play in addressing this issue. Environmentalists, among 
others, point their fingers at unrestricted timber markets across the border 
and reject government efforts to control floods by simply building higher 
levees. Many stakeholders thus call for the sustainable management of the 
entire river basin, and environmentalists even propose removing levees in 
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some places to restore the river’s natural flow, rehabilitate wetlands and 
create natural reservoirs. Interestingly, some local mayors joined the 
environmentalists in support of these alternative solutions.  
Since flooding as a problem, should not exist in the first place (flooding is a 
natural part of ecosystems), these voices are remarkably silent on how the 
flood burden should be distributed or pooled. However, among most of the 
interviewees, there was a deep distrust of private insurance companies and a 
sense that increased private insurance in poor areas like the Upper Tisza is 
grossly unfair. Egalitarian voices called for mutual insurance arrangements 
with continuing cross-subsidies to those less fortunate who are unable to 
afford the risks with which they live. Solidarity with disaster victims is a 
valued social attribute, even a moral imperative, but it should not take the 
form of hierarchical paternalism. 
The Contested Terrain 
The stakeholder interviews point to three distinct strategies the Hungarian 
community can take for reducing flood losses in the Upper Tisza region and 
for offering relief to flood victims. At one extreme, the government can 
continue to absorb a large share of the costs of mit igation and public relief 
by continuing to build and maintain  levees, generously compensate flood 
victims, and control development in flood-risk areas with top-down zoning 
regulations. These choices will likely lead to a worsening of the central 
government’s budget deficit and, despite regulation, encourage undesired 
development in flood-prone areas.  
Alternatively, the government can withdraw resources from this area and 
rely more strongly on market forces to encourage individual responsibility 
for reducing losses and insuring against them. However, even proponents of 
this strategy rejected mandatory insurance, and with the exception of the 
insurance company representative, there was widespread opposition to risk-
based policies. This strategy would likely lead to increased diligence on the 
part of farmers and landowners, but also an increased burden on vulnerable 
populations. It could also lead to out-migration and the abandonment of 
some historic villages.  
A third policy strategy would be to preserve the area’s ecology. Those who 
support these policy measures state that this could be achieved through 
subsidized programs to help farmers change land-use practices, the re-
naturalization of the river through levee removal, and the provision of 
infrastructure for soft tourism. Insurance may be an option, but only by 
circumventing commercial insurers with non-profit , mutual arrangements. 
This should not preclude solidarity in providing flood relief and 
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compensation. Skeptics of this approach point out that these measures will 
not reduce the risks to already existing villages and may require relocation of 
villagers and farms. Also, excluding the 16 commercial insurers covering 
floods in Hungary will not solve the government’s budgetary problems.  
While these three contending policy paths – state protectionism, individual 
responsibility and ecological preservation – emerged from the interviews, 
this does not mean that the stakeholders consistently advocated any one 
policy direction. On the contrary, stakeholders often took a mixed view. 
Almost all agreed that levees in certain areas are essential and individual 
initiatives to reduce flood risk should be encouraged, sometimes with 
economic incentives. There was near unanimity that a transfer of the burden 
to an already vulnerable population cannot be justified by arguments of 
efficiency and loss reduction. Typical policy paths are intricate and 
overlapping in the eyes of stakeholders, yet there is little question that at the 
institutional and policy levels – the “meso” level- the policy terrain is 
contested along these lines. The challenge for the IIASA study was to 
identify the relative depth of support for these contending and contested 
policy directions (and their hybrids), and more importantly to identify an 
intersection of these directions, or a clumsy path, that could command a 
wide base of support among stakeholders. For this purpose, empirical 
information on stakeholder views and the possibility for compromise was 
elicited through a public survey. 
Round Two: The Public Survey 
Based on stakeholder interviews, a questionnaire with face-to-face 
interviews was administered to 400 Hungarians. The purpose was to elicit 
public stakeholder views on Hungary’s options for reducing flood risk and 
providing relief to victims. Four separate locations in Hungary were chosen 
in order to include stakeholders at high risk to flooding in both rural and 
urban areas, as well as urban and rural stakeholders who subsidize those 
living in high-risk areas through their tax and insurance payments. The 
sample size in each area was 100. Settlements in rural areas were chosen 
randomly, and the number of participants was determined according to 
population size. The sample was selected to be representative in terms of 
gender and age for each region (for more survey details see Vári, et al. 
2003). 
The public survey confirmed that when it comes to floods, the majority of 
Hungarians continue to view their world as it has been - with a paternalistic 
state assuming responsibility for their well-being. The main causes of 
flooding were seen as lack of levee maintenance, clearing of large forest 
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areas in the catchments area and insufficient height and strength of the 
levees. Significantly, the least important cause was attributed to local people 
taking insufficient preventive measures or building in flood-risk areas. At the 
same time, a third of the respondents blamed the authorities for having 
issued building permits in areas with high inundation risk. In mitigating the 
risks, low rankings were given to measures such as financial incentives, 
including risk-based insurance premiums, encouraging inhabitants to migrate 
out of high-risk areas, the introduction of alternative agricultural practices 
and re-naturalization of parts of the river. These results confirm the findings 
of stakeholder interviews in which it was found that a majority of 
Hungarians blame the ir government or neighboring countries for escalating 
flood losses. Few appear to hold those living and working in high-risk areas 
as responsible for contributing increased flood risk.  
In line with this perspective, responses strongly indicate that responsibility 
should be mainly in the hands of the central government rather than in the 
hands of property owners living in high-risk areas. When people were asked 
to select those responsible for assuming flood risk (more than one answer 
could be given), 92 percent of respondents put the central government in first 
or second place, 51 percent held neighboring countries responsible, 49 
percent cited municipalities, and only 10 percent held property owners 
responsible . Corresponding to the view that the central government is mainly 
responsible for flood losses, a large majority of the respondents would fully 
or partially support the continuation of Hungary's generous public 
compensation system. Importantly, an equally large majority was, at the 
same time, sympathetic with switching to more individual responsibility. 
Indeed, later questions show a great deal of support for a joint public -private 
insurance system in Hungary.  
What motivates Hungarians to express such strong solidarity with flood 
victims? Considering Hungary’s history of government protection against 
flooding, it is not surprising that 51 percent of respondents justify financial 
assistance to flood victims, claiming that flood protection is the 
responsibility of the government and thus flooding is the fault of the 
government. If the river overflows the levees and floods the villages, the 
government is to blame since it has not built the levees strong or high 
enough. Alternatively, 26 percent of respondents justify victim relief on the 
grounds that the government has always provided compensation. Nineteen 
percent justify financial support to victims on the solidarity principle. This 
strong majority does not mean that there are no contending views in 
Hungary. A small but important minority of respondents is not in favor of 
compensating flood victims. Among the cons, respondents thought that 
compensation is too costly for taxpayers and that it often goes to the 
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wealthy. They also felt that compensation discourages people from 
purchasing insurance.  
This plurality of views was evident throughout the survey results. For 
example, there were mixed views on whether households in low-risk areas 
would be willing to pay higher flood insurance premiums to subsidize the 
premiums of those in poor, high-risk areas. As shown in figure 2, people in 
low-risk areas considered cross-subsidization unfair, but a surprising 
number, between 20 and 30 percent, supported cross subsid ies on the 
grounds of social solidarity, especially for poor regions. This result was 
consistent with responses to taxpayer support: nearly one-third of the 
respondents in the low- and no-risk areas support taxpayer solidarity with 
Tisza flood victims. It is remarkable that approximately 76 percent of the 
respondents thought the government should compensate every victim 
regardless of the victim's economic circumstances or role in preventing 
losses. 
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Upper Tisza
Downstream
No risk rural
No risk urban
Should insurers charge the same insurance premium for people living 
in low-risk areas (e.g, the hills) as for people living in high-risk areas 
(e.g, the Tisza area)? 
No, this is unfair
Yes, because of social solidarity
Yes, because the people in the  high-risk areas area are poor
No, this will encourage building in risk areas
Other, such as …
do not know
yes
61%
only if low-income 
persons are assisted 
in purchasing 
insurance 
28%
no
10%
do not know
1%
Figure 3:  Respondents' views on whether property owners should 
insure themselves against flood damage 
Figure 2: Respondents' views on risk sharing by region  
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A majority of respondents fully or partially subscribe to the continuation of 
Hungary's generous victim compensation system, and at the same time a 
majority of interviewees are in favor of more individual responsibility. 
Exploring this duality further, as shown in figure 3, over 60 percent of 
people surveyed (but fewer in the Upper Tisza region) thought it would be  
desirable for property owners to have insurance against flood losses. Only 
about half as many (but higher in the Upper Tisza region) shared this opinion 
on the condition that low-income individuals receive public assistance in 
purchasing insurance. Although private insurance was viewed for the most 
part as desirable, only about a third of the respondents thought it should be 
mandatory and another third thought it should be conditional on assistance 
to low-income persons. Most importantly, half of the respondents supported 
a mixed public-private system of victim relief. This finding is consistent 
with earlier results indicating that many Hungarians regard government 
compensation and private insurance as complementary. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss all questions and responses on 
the public survey. As a short summary, the questionnaire results confirmed 
that the Hungarian public has differing views concerning the management of 
flood risk in the Upper Tisza region. These views appear to depend to some 
extent upon economic interests – those living in high and dry areas are less 
disposed to generous taxpayer aid and other forms of solidarity with flood 
victims – and to an important extent on notions of a fair society. Almost one  
third of people surveyed in the high-dry areas support flood aid. The results 
showed little sympathy for extreme market positions or extreme ideas on a 
more ecological solution to the problem. Hierarchical government still 
commands wide support in Hungary. However, in light of recent history, the 
minority views in favor of increased individual responsibility and more 
holistic development policies are revealing and important.   
Round Three: Designing a National Insurance Program 
It can be recalled that a challenge for this pilot study was to develop a citizen 
participatory process that can accommodate the different perspectives and 
articulate a way forward. Ideally the process would lead to a flood insurance 
program that is compatible with the Hungarian legal, economic and political 
system and is viewed as efficient and fair by the stakeholders. Following the 
first two information-gathering rounds (the stakeholder interviews and 
public questionnaire), the research team proposed three policy paths or 
options that appeared consistent with the majority and minority views of the 
stakeholders and that were compatible with the political and institutional 
setting. These options took account of (1) the apparent widespread 
stakeholder support for continuing large government involvement in a 
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national insurance program with post-disaster relief to flood victims; and (2) 
the simultaneous endorsement of introducing limited individual 
responsibility and insurance. The three policy options for a nation-wide 
public/private insurance system are shown in figure 4 and described below: 
Option A continues current practices by combining extensive government 
post-disaster relief with voluntary, flat-rate (cross-subsidized) insurance;  
Option B places more responsibility on households living in high-risk areas 
to reduce their risks and purchase insurance. The government thus 
compensates victims by a lesser amount (perhaps only assuring their 
subsistence), and the public role is supplemented by two insurance layers: 
voluntary (but bundled) private insurance based on a flat-rate premium and, 
if a household wishes greater coverage, voluntary, risk-based insurance (this 
option was suggested in the World Bank report, see Halcrow 1999). 
Option C is notably similar to the TCIP in a sense that it reduces the role of 
private insurers with the creation of a fully public, but privately 
administered, insurance system (government disaster fund) financed through 
mandatory contributions from all property owners throughout Hungary. 
Unlike the TCIP, however, the Hungarian system contributions would not be 
based on flood risk and the government would subsidize insurance premiums 
for low-income households.  
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The consensus commendation The TCIP  
Figure 4: Insurance Program Options 
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Round Four: Revising the Policy Options with Support 
from a Flood Risk Policy Model 
To demonstrate the financial consequences of the three pooling options (A, 
B and C in figure 4) a flood risk policy model was developed for a pilot area 
in the Upper Tisza region in collaboration with VITUKI Consult (Brouwers 
2002; Ekenberg, et al. 2002; Ermolieva 2002, Galambos et al. 2001; 
Hansson, et al. 2001). Depending on the option chosen, the aim of the model 
was to simulate the incidence of future flood losses on three key stakeholder 
groups: flood victims in the pilot basin, insurance companies and the central 
government. The simulation model generated a probabilistic distribution of 
future flood losses in the pilot basin over ten years and illustrated the effects 
of this distribution given selected policy interventions. As shown in figure 1, 
it consisted of four modules: (1) a one-dimensional, hydrological model of 
the river based on probabilistic input of water levels at the source, (2) a GIS-
based flood model with values for residential properties, industry and crops 
in the pilot area, (3) an inundation or flood-loss model with property 
vulnerabilities and (4) a policy module that illustrated the effects of policy 
changes. Modules one to three integrated the following assessments: 
probability of the peril (high water) in the selected geographic region, 
probability of levee failure or over-topping of the levee, vulnerability of the 
properties concerned and the potential financial loss. The policy model 
simulated the effects of selected insurance-pool options on the profits of 
insurers, on the government budget and on those living in the pilot basin. 
The model was designed to be as realistic as possible given available data 
and knowledge, but it was not presented to the stakeholders as a full reality.  
Ravetz (2003) suggests that models be viewed as metaphors, as illustrations 
of reality without any pretence of representing the full complexity of the 
physical and behavioral context. Many simplifying assumptions with respect 
to the data, the scale of the analysis and the functioning of the 
physical/economic system were necessary (for a detailed description of the 
assumptions and parameters, see Brouwers 2002). 
Armed with model simulations of options A, B and C shown in figure 4, the 
IIASA team returned to the key stakeholders to refine the policy options 
based on the interviewee’s values, knowledge of the political playing field 
and economic constraints (see Ekenberg, et al. 2002). A slightly different 
picture emerged from the more detailed discussions with stakeholders 
informed by the model results. The revised options (A1, B1 and C1 
illustrated in figure 4) differ from those described above mainly in the 
reduction of government compensation to victims, fully eliminating this 
compensation in options B and C. The full elimination of any post-disaster 
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government support for rebuilding the homes of flood victims (and other 
forms of compensation) was a radical shift from earlier stakeholder 
positions. It was triggered by the recognition that solidarity need not mean 
extensive post-disaster compensation but could also take the form of 
subsidies for pre-disaster loss reduction and insurance. Indeed, across-the-
board government relief might mean that households with insurance actually 
receive more that 100 percent compensation for losses. This was rejected by 
several stakeholders who found such compensation unfair. This combination 
of government relief through a market mechanism, which would also appeal 
to social justice, was a first hint at a consensus “clumsy” policy package.  
Another interesting view, which counters the economist’s emphasis on 
building incentive structures to dissuade people from moving to high-risk 
areas, is the wish to keep people in risky areas. Bearing in mind that a 
significant portion of Hungary is at high risk for flooding, relocation might 
be more expensive than other measures. “In the Upper Tisza basin, people 
can survive on very little money and lead reasonable lives, which would not 
be possible if they were relocated to cities.” (Interview with a local mayor, 
2002). Correspondingly, many stakeholders expressed dissatisfaction with 
instituting risk-based premiums. An exception, not surprisingly, was voiced 
by a representative of the Association of Hungarian Insurers (MABISZ), 
who would like to see more risk-based insurance but with the government 
aiding those who cannot afford the high premiums: “The government should 
subsidize the poor by the difference between the risk-based and flat-rate 
premiums.” (Interview with a MABISZ representative, 2002). There was 
generally broad support for assisting low-income households in high-risk 
areas.  
The diverse and mixed stakeholder views on the role of the government, 
individuals and the insurance industry in absorbing flood losses led to a 
revised set of options (A1, B1 and C1 shown in figure 4) for a nationwide 
insurance program (for details see Linnerooth-Bayer and Väri, forthcoming). 
In effect, stakeholders participated in revising the options from moderate 
support for state protectionism toward more market-oriented and egalitarian 
perspectives. The revisions reflected the almost unanimous view that poor 
households should be assisted and the polarized views on the respective roles 
of private, risk-based insurance and a government fund.  
Round Five: The Stakeholder Workshop 
The stakeholder workshop was held in September 2002 in Vasarosnameny, a 
town in the Upper Tisza flood-risk area. Participants included 
representatives of the key stakeholder groups, the local mayor, a resident of 
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a non-risk area, the leader of a local environmental group, officials of the 
regional water management authority and the national authority for disaster 
management, and a representative of a major international brokerage firm. 
The representative from the Hungarian insurance industry was not able to 
attend.  
The workshop was a forum for stakeholders to argue their policy positions 
and consider the arguments of other participants. The idea was to explore the 
ground where citizens can agree on a policy direction, but for different 
reasons. This may or may not exist, but deliberation and citizen participation 
can be effective means of formulating citizen grievances, ideas and views 
and feeding them into the policy process (Renn and Webler 1995).  
The workshop began with a discussion of flood risk management issues in 
the region followed by the introduction of the three revised options shown in 
figure 4. The policy model showed simulation results of how these options 
distribute flood losses among the three stakeholder groups. Participants were 
asked to choose their preferred insurance policy option and were given time 
to change the option of their choice in any way to correspond more closely 
with their view of an efficient, fair and workable system. Participants were 
then grouped according to the option chosen and asked to negotiate a 
common view in their subgroup – a kind of mini-consensus within a single 
perspective (a similar discursive process was carried out in focus groups for 
pension reform, see Ney 2002).  
After arguing for their policy perspectives, the workshop participants turned 
to a lively and heated discussion on a possible compromise. This 
deliberation led to the imaginative new system shown in figure 4: Only 
households with private insurance would qualify for government assistance 
after a disaster, but the government would heavily subsidize poor households 
in their purchase of voluntary, private flood insurance. It was also agreed 
that the government would not provide reinsurance for private insurers. This 
type of insurance program is similar to what is being currently discussed in 
Italy.  
Details are shown in the box below: 
Consensus Option 
Government compensation only to insured households 
A private insurance system with 
- bundled or separate policies for all types of natural disaster risks, 
- covering approximately 50 percent of  damage 
- voluntary, flat-rate premiums  
Government subsidies for poor households up to 100 percent of premium. 
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This consensus is a radical departure from current practice since the 
government will compensate victims only if they have purchased partial 
cover from private insurers. As shown in figure 4, this feature is identical to 
the TCIP. Here similarity with the TCIP ends, however, since the Hungarian 
stakeholders supported a voluntary, private system with substantial cross 
subsidies and solidarity among premium payers. This latter feature is 
characteristic of the French national insurance system (Linnerooth-Bayer, et 
al. 2001). In contrast to the French system, Hungarian taxpayers will play no 
role in guaranteeing the solvency of private insurers by offering public 
reinsurance. A public guarantee is also not necessary since the private 
insurers can collect premiums that allow them to purchase reinsurance in the 
private market. 
This is not the case in Turkey and other highly exposed developing countries 
where a public -private system of the sort found in many developed countries 
(and proposed for Hungary) would not be affordable for most households. 
The Turkish system is the first of its kind in a developing country and it has 
been made possible partly by the World Bank’s support in financing two 
separate layers of the risk. As shown in figure 4, the World Bank funds the 
second risk layer by agreeing to finance 100 percent of claims up to US$82.5 
million if the losses during the initial years are greater than the funds built up 
in the pool. A large part of the third risk layer has been ceded in the global 
reinsurance market, whereas the highest risk layer up to a certain limit is 
again financed by the World Bank. In total, the World Bank will provide up 
to US$100 million in an uncommitted contingent loan facility (note that the 
subsidy is in terms of a loan with favorable terms). The facility is a standby 
(contingent) line of credit, with an option to be drawn (given to the pool) in 
the event of a disaster and against specific claims. The TCIP pays a standby 
contingent fee for this option every year in lieu of reinsurance premium. In 
turn, the World Bank can cover part of its risk exposure by engaging in risk 
transfer arrangements in the international financial markets in its own name. 
In this way, the Bank has substituted the unpredictable granting of post-
disaster loans for a calculable annual commitment to the insurance system. 
The disbursement of this facility will be contingent upon progress in 
regulatory reform and prevention measures. A major obstacle is posed by the 
Turkish parliament, which at this writing had not passed the requisite 
legislation for continuation of this mandatory insurance pool.  
The Hungarian compromise was articulated by giving a voice to all 
stakeholder perspectives. However, there are many caveats. The nine people  
at the workshop may not have adequately represented the full range of 
stakeholder perspectives and interests. The Hungarian insurance 
representative was not able to attend and a representative from the London-
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based Benfield-Greig brokerage played the role of insurer. It is doubtful that 
Hungarian insurers would embrace the solution laid out in the compromise 
option, which requires them to offer expanded coverage at flat-based rates. 
Indeed, the main insurance company has recently withdrawn from the high-
risk Tisza area since it has suffered extensive losses from the cascade of 
recent floods and residents cannot afford to pay the risk-based premiums. 
Moreover, in a follow-up interview with a high-level insurance 
representative, it was recently learned that the insurance industry is currently 
negotiating directly with government representatives in the prime minister’s 
office. They are suggesting yet another version: the government would offer 
insurance at a highly subsidized rate and private insurers would withdraw 
entirely from high flood-risk areas. This version is a combination of options 
A1 and C1 and slants rewards in favor of insurers at the expense of 
taxpayers. A compromise solution is currently under negotiation in the 
Hungarian parliament, but the shape of the proposed legislation has not been 
finalized.  
Conclusions 
For this pilot study, the insurance scheme selected is less important than the 
participatory, deliberative process that respects and builds upon conflicting 
stakeholder perspectives and achieves consensus on a policy path. Starting 
with a very broad survey of views, interests and perspectives, the range of 
policy options was narrowed and refined through iterative interactions with 
stakeholders, who were knowledgeable, influential, and representative (at the 
meso-level) of different worldviews and perspectives. This iterative 
interaction with the stakeholders profited from the flood risk policy model, 
which simulated the effects of selected insurance-pool options on the profits 
of insurers, on the government budget and on those living in the pilot basin. 
The process gradually moved from contested discussions characterized by 
non-viable policy solutions to increasingly viable options. The discussions 
culminated in a stakeholder workshop with agreement on a single policy 
recommendation. This agreement was achieved through a process of 
deliberation, first in the mini-groups structured around a similar perspective 
and then among the different perspectives of the three groups. The 
arguments were based on differing ideas surrounding what constitutes a fair 
insurance program. Pragmatic considerations and economic interests were 
also taken into account. Importantly, many participants transcended their 
own economic interests to argue for one or another concept of a fair 
program.  
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One of the more significant findings of the public  survey was that over thirty 
percent of the respondents living in high and dry areas were willing to 
purchase flood insurance at rates that assured subsidies to those living in risk 
areas. Another significant finding was the almost unanimous agreement that 
the government should assist poor inhabitants living in flood-risk areas. 
There was also recognition by key stakeholders that this assistance need not 
be in the form of direct compensation or rebuilt houses. Rather, it could take 
the form of a pre-disaster policy, namely subsidizing the insurance payments 
of poor households. 
Stakeholder consensus on the design of a nationwide disaster insurance 
system in Hungary is similar to, though not exactly the same as, the 
agreement reached by the World Bank and Turkish policy makers on the 
design of the Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool. A main similarity is that 
the central governments in both countries will reduce their fiscal 
responsibility since they will be obligated to compensate earthquake and 
flood victims only with insurance. This is a major break from traditional 
practices in both countries, and some question its political feasibility. The 
important differences are twofold: first, in contrast to Turkey, disaster 
insurance in Hungary, as proposed by the stakeholders, would not be 
mandatory. In fact, all stakeholders opposed obligatory insurance, although 
the practice of bundling flood cover with property insurance that is 
mandatory for a mortgage, has already led to a very high uptake of insurance 
in Hungary (greater, for example , than in the U.S.). Also in contrast to 
Turkey, insurance payments in Hungary would not be risk based. As a 
demonstration of social solidarity, the government would provide subsidies 
to poor households to purchase private insurance.  
Many Hungarians appear to value social solidarity with disaster victims 
more than incentive gains from risk-based premiums. This option was 
endorsed by the Hungarian government despite its fiscal concerns because of 
the longer-term perspective of building a culture of private responsibility in 
poor and vulnerable areas. While economists view this finding as inefficient, 
ultimately leading to higher economic losses, economists’ concern with 
distorted prices and misplaced incentives may be less appropriate for 
developing countries. Whereas risk-based premiums are viewed as essential 
in wealthy countries to avoid subsidies to large-scale , high-end development 
in high-risk areas, the loss-reduction measures that poor farmers can take in 
the Tisza region are limited and may not increase substantially with the 
incentives imposed by risk-based insurance pricing. Moreover, the main 
concern is not that pricey development will move into the Tisza area, but 
that poor farmers will leave and seek non-existent jobs in cities. In the case 
of poor countries, it may be prudent to follow the UK’s example and start 
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with subsidized insurance premiums and gradually move to risk-based 
policies as the region and country develops.  
The Hungarian stakeholder consensus, based only on nine workshop 
participants, clearly cannot claim to be representative of the full range of 
policy options in Hungary. In fact, the insurance company voice was 
underrepresented at the workshop. The purpose of deliberative stakeholder 
processes is not to replace representative democracy, but to sensitize 
political representatives and policy makers to the diverse constructions of a 
problem and its solutions and to explore areas of agreement. The results of 
the Hungarian process cannot be transplanted to Turkey, but interesting 
questions have been raised. Has the stakeholder process in Turkey, where 
stakeholders are informed by a seismic catastrophe model, flagged the 
difficulties now apparent in the parliament when legislating the program?  
In sum, the Tisza project is innovative in four ways: First, it develops an 
integrated risk assessment approach by combining information technology 
with public participation through stakeholder interviews, surveys and 
stakeholder workshops; second, techniques for public involvement are 
grounded in a recognition and respect of diverse values and views on the part 
of stakeholders and the need to develop democratic governing institutions; 
third, it is based on (and extends) the methodology of catastrophe modeling 
by combining Monte Carlo simulations to generate probability loss 
distribution; and fourth, it has reached a “pilot” consensus on an innovative 
disaster insurance scheme for Hungary that has good prospects for receiving 
wide-scale credibility, legitimacy and support.  
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